Democracy Unchained: Contractualism, Individualism, and Independence in Buchanan’s Democratic Theory

被引:0
作者
John Thrasher
机构
[1] Chapman University,Philosophy Department, The Smith Institute of Political Economy and Philosophy
来源
Homo Oeconomicus | 2019年 / 36卷
关键词
James Buchanan; Democracy; Contractualism; Liberalism; B3; B41;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Contrary to the claims of some of his critics, James Buchanan was an ardent democrat. I argue that Buchanan’s conception of democratic governance organized by a contractually justified constitution is highly distinctive because of his commitment to a strong conception of individualism. For Buchanan, democracy is neither justified instrumentally—by the goods it generates—nor by reference to some antecedent conception of justice. Instead, democracy is the only political option for a society that takes individualism seriously. One implication of this view is that democracies can only be limited by the rules they collectively give themselves in the form of constitutions. I explicate this conception of democracy and address some of its implications, assumptions, and challenges.
引用
收藏
页码:25 / 40
页数:15
相关论文
共 12 条
[1]  
Brennan J(2009)Polluting the polls: When citizens should not vote Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 535-549
[2]  
Buchanan J(1954)Social choice, democracy, and free markets Journal of Political Economy 62 114-123
[3]  
Buchanan J(1954)Individual choice in voting and the market Journal of Political Economy 62 334-343
[4]  
Gauthier D(2013)Achieving pareto-optimality: Invisible hands, social contracts, and rational deliberation Rationality Markets and Morals 4 191-204
[5]  
Gauthier D(2013)Twenty-five on Ethics 123 601-624
[6]  
Gordon S(1974)Frank knight and the tradition of liberalism Journal of Political Economy 82 571-577
[7]  
Kliemt H(2011)Bukantianism—Buchanan's philosophical economics Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 80 275-279
[8]  
Knight FH(1950)Economic and social policy in democratic society Journal of Political Economy 58 513-522
[9]  
List C(2002)Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result Economics and Philosophy 18 89-110
[10]  
Pettit P(2014)Uniqueness and symmetry in bargaining theories of justice Philosophical Studies 167 683-699