Agent-Based Simulation in the Study of Social Dilemmas

被引：0
作者：
N.M. Gotts
J.G. Polhill
A.N.R. Law
机构：
[1] Macaulay Land Use Research Institute,
来源：
Artificial Intelligence Review | 2003年 / 19卷
关键词：
agents; altruism; cooperation; economics; evolution; games; simulation;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This review discusses agent-based social simulation(ABSS) in relation tothe study of social dilemmas such as the Prisoner'sDilemma and Tragedy of the Commons. Its aims are to explore theplace of ABSS in relation to other research methods such asmathematical analysis, to familiariseartificial intelligence researchers (particularly those working onmulti-agent systems)with a body of relevant multidisciplinary work, and to suggest directionsfor future ABSS research on social dilemmas.
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页码：3 / 92
页数：89
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