Network externalities in a dynamic monopoly

被引：0

作者：

Luca Lambertini

Raimondello Orsini

机构：

[1] Università degli Studi di Bologna,Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche

[2] University of Amsterdam,ENCORE, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics

来源：

Central European Journal of Operations Research | 2007年 / 15卷

关键词：

Monopoly; Network externality; Critical mass; Capital accumulation; D62; D92; L12; 91A23;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We reconsider the role of network externalities in a dynamic spatial monopoly where the firm must invest in order to accumulate capacity, while consumers may have either linear or quadratic preferences. We (1) characterise saddle point equilibria, (2) prove that the extent of market coverage is increasing in the network effect and (3) unlike the existing static literature on the same problem, the monopolist may not make introductory price offers. Then, we briefly deal with the socially optimal solution, showing that, in general, a planner would serve more consumers than a profit-seeking monopolist.

引用

页码：105 / 117

页数：12

共 18 条

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