Efforts in two-sided contests

被引：0
作者：
Gil S. Epstein
Shmuel Nitzan
Mordechai E. Schwarz
机构：
[1] Bar-Ilan University,Department of Economics
[2] IZA,Department of Economics and Management
[3] CReAM,undefined
[4] The Open University of Israel,undefined
来源：
Public Choice | 2008年 / 136卷
关键词：
Rent dissipation; Contests; Incomplete information; Lobbying; Transparency;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The degree of rent dissipation is studied in extended two-sided contests that involve two types of efforts. While usual contestants expend resources in trying to win the contested prize, potential recipients of the rent-seeking efforts also participate in the contest. This is due to uncertainty regarding the source of power in the contest that induces the bureaucrats to expend resources to increase their share in the rent-seeking efforts by trying to appear as the party controlling the allocation of the prize. We show that the existing theoretical and empirical studies are incomplete and may underestimate the extent of rent dissipation.
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页码：283 / 291
页数：8
相关论文
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