Models and scientific representations or: who is afraid of inconsistency?

被引：0
作者：
Mathias Frisch
机构：
[1] University of Maryland,
来源：
Synthese | 2014年 / 191卷
关键词：
Inconsistency; Representation; Classical electrodynamics; Models;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
I argue that if we make explicit the role of the user of scientific representations not only in the application but also in the construction of a model or representation, then inconsistent modeling assumptions do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to our representational practices.
引用
收藏
页码：3027 / 3040
页数：13
相关论文
共 11 条
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