A private contributions game for joint replenishment

被引：0
作者：
Evren Körpeoğlu
Alper Şen
Kemal Güler
机构：
[1] Bilkent University,Department of Industrial Engineering
[2] Hewlett-Packard Laboratories,undefined
来源：
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research | 2012年 / 75卷
关键词：
Joint replenishment; Economic order quantity; Non-cooperative games; Private contributions;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment by n firms that operate under an EOQ-like setting. Each firm decides whether to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much to contribute to joint ordering costs in case of participation. Joint replenishment cycle time is set by an intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be financed with the private contributions of participating firms. We characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria.
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页码：67 / 82
页数：15
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