The asymmetric relation between earnings management behaviors: evidence from executive compensation incentives

被引：0
作者：
Chou P.-I. [1 ]
Lee C.-H. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Department of Business, National Open University, New Taipei
[2] Department of Finance, National Taichung University of Science and Technology, Taichung
来源：
Journal of Economics and Finance | 2018年 / 42卷 / 4期
关键词：
Earnings management; Executive stock-based compensation incentives; Panel threshold model;
D O I：
10.1007/s12197-018-9426-1
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether executive stock-based compensation incentives induce the relation between accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM) to become asymmetric. The empirical results show that there is the substitute relation between AEM and REM when CEOs have the lowest degree of stock-based compensation incentives. However, there is the complementary relation between AEM and REM when CEOs have the median degree of stock-based compensation incentives. Moreover, the results also present a trade-off relation exists in the highest degree financial incentives during the post-SOX period, but this relation does not exist in the same regime during the pre-SOX period. These findings provide new insight into executive compensation mechanism for shareholders, investors, and regulators, resulting in the efficiency to prevent managers from obtaining private gains at shareholders’ expense. © 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
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页码：765 / 778
页数：13
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