The Complexity of Coordination

被引：0

作者：

Taghawi-Nejad D. ^{[1
]}

Veetil V.P. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Center for Metropolitan Studies, São Paulo

[2] Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax

来源：

Eastern Economic Journal | 2017年 / 43卷 / 2期

关键词：

complexity; coordination; emergence; interaction; network;

D O I：

10.1057/s41302-016-0012-y

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

The traditional mechanism of finding Nash equilibria presumes economic actors are capable of performing computations that even computers would take far too long to complete. A decentralized and parallel process of interactions between simple economic actors is presented as a more plausible microfoundation of the concept of Nash equilibria. It is found that agent interactions on a scale-free network converge to an equilibrium within reasonable time. NP computational complexity of Nash equilibria does not diminish its empirical relevance. © 2016 Eastern Economic Association.

引用

页码：260 / 270

页数：10

共 62 条

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