An intergenerational model of domestic violence

被引:0
作者
Pollak R.A. [1 ]
机构
[1] Department of Economics, Campus Box 1208, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130, One Brookings Drive
关键词
Domestic violence; Family violence; Spousal abuse;
D O I
10.1007/s00148-003-0177-7
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This paper proposes and analyzes an intergenerational model of domestic violence (IMDV) in which behavioral strategies or scripts are transmitted from parents to children. The model rests upon three key assumptions: The probability that a husband will be violent depends on whether he grew up in a violent home. The probability that a wife will remain with a violent husband depends on whether she grew up in a violent home. Individuals who grew up in violent homes tend to marry individuals who grew up in violent homes. The IMDV calls attention to three features neglected in the domestic violence literature. The first is the marriage market. If some men are more likely than others to be violent as husbands and if some women are more likely than others to remain in violent marriages, then the level of violence is sensitive to the probability that such individuals will marry each other. The second neglected feature is divorce: ongoing domestic violence requires the conjunction of a husband who is violent and a wife who stays in the marriage. Third, variables and policies that reduce the rate of domestic violence in the current generation are likely to reduce it even further in future generations.
引用
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页码:311 / 329
页数:18
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