Approximation and characterization of Nash equilibria of large games

被引：0
作者：
Guilherme Carmona
Konrad Podczeck
机构：
[1] University of Surrey,School of Economics
[2] Universität Wien,Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
来源：
Economic Theory | 2022年 / 73卷
关键词：
Nash equilibrium; Non-atomic games; Large games; Approximation; C72;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players in terms of approximate equilibria of large finite games. This characterization precisely describes the relationship between the equilibrium sets of the two classes of games. In particular, it yields several approximation results for Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players, which roughly state that all finite-player games that are sufficiently close to a given game with a continuum of players have approximate equilibria that are close to a given Nash equilibrium of the non-atomic game.
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页码：679 / 694
页数：15
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