Potential, value, and coalition formation

被引：0
作者：
Annick Laruelle
Federico Valenciano
机构：
[1] Université de Caen Basse Normandie,Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion
[2] Universidad del País Vasco,Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV
来源：
TOP | 2008年 / 16卷
关键词：
Coalitional games; Value; Potential; Probabilistic models; 91A12;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In this paper, a simple probabilistic model of coalition formation provides a unified interpretation for several extensions of the Shapley value. Weighted Shapley values, semivalues, weak (weighted or not) semivalues, and the Shapley value itself appear as variations of this model. Moreover, some notions that have been introduced in the search of alternatives to Shapley’s seminal characterization, as ‘balanced contributions’ and the ‘potential’ are reinterpreted from this point of view. Natural relationships of these conditions with some mentioned families of ‘values’ are shown. These reinterpretations strongly suggest that these conditions are more naturally interpreted in terms of coalition formation than in terms of the classical notion of ‘value.’
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页码：73 / 89
页数：16
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