Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies

被引：0
作者：
Chiara Donnini
Maria Gabriella Graziano
Marialaura Pesce
机构：
[1] Università degli Studi di Napoli Parthenope,Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica per la Ricerca Economica
[2] Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II and CSEF,Dipartimento di Matematica e Statistica
来源：
Journal of Economics | 2014年 / 111卷
关键词：
Equity; Envy; Efficiency; Asymmetric information; C71; D51; D82;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In this paper we propose a concept of coalitional fair allocation in order to solve the tension that may exist between efficiency and envy-freeness when agents are asymmetrically informed and the equity of allocations is evaluated at the interim stage.
引用
收藏
页码：55 / 68
页数：13
相关论文
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