R&D incentives in compatible networks

被引:0
作者
Eirik Gaard Kristiansen
Marcel Thum
机构
[1] The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration,Department of Economics
[2] University of Munich,Department of Economics
来源
Journal of Economics | 1997年 / 65卷
关键词
network externalities; innovation; L10; O31; D43;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Network externalities describe the phenomenon that a good becomes more valuable to each user the more other consumers use the same or a compatible troduct. Whereas most of the recent literature on network effects has focused on the adoption of products, this paper shows that network externalities can have important feedback effects on the incentives to carry out R&D and develop new products. Even if the products are compatible, network effects can lead to strategic overinvestment or underinvestment. The firms' R&D decisions are compared with the socially optimal ones.
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页码:55 / 78
页数:23
相关论文
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