Politics and the implementation of public policy: The case of the US military housing allowance program

被引:0
作者
Scott E. Carrell
Janice A. Hauge
机构
[1] University of California,Department of Economics
[2] Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research,Department of Economics
[3] University of North Texas,undefined
来源
Public Choice | 2009年 / 138卷
关键词
Politics; Bureaucracy; Military compensation; D7;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Are bureaucracies in fact controlled by the president, Congress, or legislation? We analyze a 1998 policy change in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) $6.5 billion annual military housing allowance program. Results show that both the president and Congress were able to influence the bureaucracy, even in the presence of an exceedingly specific law that outlined the manner in which the DoD was to allocate the funds. After policy implementation, allowances were disproportionately higher in locations that (a) supported the president in the 1996 election and (b) were represented by members of the House or Senate Armed Services Committees.
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页码:367 / 386
页数:19
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