Coordinating under incomplete information

被引：0
作者：
Geir B. Asheim
Seung Han Yoo
机构：
[1] University of Oslo,Department of Economics
[2] National University of Singapore,Department of Economics
来源：
Review of Economic Design | 2008年 / 12卷
关键词：
Minimum effort games; Coordination games; Incomplete information; C72;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence.
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页码：293 / 313
页数：20
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