Constitutional courts as democratic actors and promoters of the rule of law: institutional prerequisites and normative foundations; [Verfassungsgerichte als demokratische Akteure und Förderer des Rechtsstaates: institutionelle Voraussetzungen und normative Grundlagen]

被引:0
作者
Kneip S. [1 ]
机构
[1] Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research Unit “Democracy”, Reichpietschufer 50, Berlin
关键词
Constitutional jurisdiction; Democracy; Democratization; Rule of law;
D O I
10.1007/s12286-011-0096-z
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Constitutional Courts are important players in contemporary liberal democracies. They are not only the head of the judiciary but are also quite important political actors. Although their legitimacy is still controversial in political theory and philosophy, their major role in democratic governance is beyond dispute. Nevertheless, it still remains to be answered whether and in how far constitutional courts contribute to successful processes of democratization or the establishment of the rule of law. This paper takes a first step in addressing this question by discussing the institutional arrangements and action orientations that are necessary for a court to promote democracy and the rule of law. The paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence for the fact that constitutional courts can indeed contribute to democracy and the rule of law—if the institutional circumstances support the work of the courts and if the courts show a democracy-friendly orientation. By showing that courts can be conducive to a strengthening of the rule of law and democracy under specific institutional settings, the paper sheds some light on the overarching question as to what kind of institutions (and actors) are needed to help young democracies consolidate. © 2011, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
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页码:131 / 155
页数:24
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