An ounce of prevention: opportunity structures for white-collar crime in environmental markets

Markets, in which participants are given a right to pollute that can be bought and sold, are an increasingly popular form of environmental regulation. The bulk of research in this area focuses on market implementation, efficiency, and effectiveness, but merely notes the need for strong government oversight. Despite large-scale instances of fraud in several markets, detailed understanding of what monitoring and enforcement mechanisms will effectively protect market participants is lacking. Research on criminal opportunities is primarily limited to a few studies of the European carbon market. In the following paper, we begin to fill this gap in the literature. We draw upon Benson and colleagues’ extensions of routine activities and situational crime prevention theories to examine how business systems, processes, and networks increase or reduce opportunities for white-collar crime. Specifically, we assess whether these reconceptualized opportunity theories explain the differing levels of known white-collar crime in two domestic markets: the United States Acid Rain Program and the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard Program. Implications for theory and practice will be discussed.