Exemplification and Constituent Realism: A Clarification and Modest Defense

被引:0
作者
James Porter Moreland
机构
[1] Biola University,
来源
Axiomathes | 2013年 / 23卷
关键词
Realism; Constituent ontology; Exemplification;
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摘要
In this article I present and (modestly) defend a hybrid position which we may call a Platonist constituent ontology. More specifically, I present a version of exemplification which entails (1) a certain form of Platonism, (2) a constituent ontology of ordinary objects, (3) a view of exemplification as a “tiedto” nexus, and (4) a view of properties as abstract objects that are non-spatially “in” ordinary objects. I clarify two sets of preliminary issues, present my hybrid analysis of exemplification, raise and seek to undercut an argument against my constituent realism, and surface some of the costs and benefits relevant to assessing the relative merits of relational versus constituent realism.
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页码:247 / 259
页数:12
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