Vacuous Information Affects Bargaining

被引：0
作者：
Christian Korth
J. Philipp Reiß
机构：
[1] University of Bayreuth,Department of Economics VWL IV
[2] Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT),Institute of Economics
来源：
Group Decision and Negotiation | 2014年 / 23卷
关键词：
Ultimatum game; Vacuous information; Experiment ; Bargaining; Self-serving bias; Anchoring; C90 (Design of Experiments: Group Behavior); C78 (Bargaining);
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We introduce vacuous information into buyer-seller ultimatum exchanges and provide evidence that it can affect bargaining outcomes. Notably bargaining behavior is affected asymmetrically in a way that leads allocative efficiency to respond negatively. Our results are consistent with self-serving bias that commands players to interpret vacuous information in a self-serving way.
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页码：921 / 936
页数：15
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