Repeated Play of Potential Games

被引：5

作者：

Yu. M. Ermoliev

S. D. Flaam

机构：

[1] IIASA,Department of Economics

[2] University of Bergen,undefined

来源：

Cybernetics and Systems Analysis | 2002年 / 38卷 / 3期

关键词：

potential games; repeated play; Nash equilibrium; distributed computation;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1020356525935

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

So-called potential functions are important, prominent, and common to many diverse fields, including optimization, dynamic processes, and physics. Monderer and Shapley have added a class of noncooperative games to that list. In the present paper, their notion is extended and repeated play of such games is considered. A unified convergence analysis is provided and procedures that account for efficiency or viability are shown.

引用

页码：355 / 367

页数：12

共 9 条

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[2]

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[3]

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[4]

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[7]

Weitzman M. L.(undefined)undefined undefined undefined undefined-undefined

[8]

Slade M. E.(undefined)undefined undefined undefined undefined-undefined

[9]

Voorneveld M.(undefined)undefined undefined undefined undefined-undefined

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