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The Böhm–Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis
被引：0
作者：
Marina Núñez
Carles Rafels
机构：
[1] University of Barcelona,Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics, CREB and CREA
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory
|
2005年
/
33卷
关键词：
assignment games;
Böhm–Bawerk horse market;
Shapley value;
nucleolus;
τ–value;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Single–valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm–Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the τ value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. The Shapley value is in the core only if the game is a square glove market, and in this case also coincides with the two aforementioned solutions.
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页码：421 / 430
页数：9
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