Delegation aus der Sicht der Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie

被引:0
作者
Fabrizio Gilardi
Dietmar Braun
机构
[1] Université de Lausanne,Institut d’Etudes Politiques et Internationales
来源
Politische Vierteljahresschrift | 2002年 / 43卷
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页码:147 / 161
页数:14
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