In defense of non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony

被引：0
作者：
Timothy Perrine
机构：
[1] Indiana University,Department of Philosophy
来源：
Synthese | 2014年 / 191卷
关键词：
Testimony; Non-reductionism; Defeaters; Jennifer Lackey;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Almost everyone agrees that many testimonial beliefs constitute knowledge. According to non-reductionists, some testimonial beliefs possess positive epistemic status independent of that conferred by perception, memory, and induction. Recently, Jennifer Lackey has provided a counterexample to a popular version of this view. Here I argue that her counterexample fails.
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页码：3227 / 3237
页数：10
相关论文
共 4 条
  • [1] Audi R(1997)The place of testimony in the fabric of knowledge and justification American Philosophical Quarterly 34 405-22
  • [2] Burge T(1993)Content preservation The Philosophical Review 102 457-488
  • [3] Burge T(1997)Interlocution, perception, and memory Philosophical Studies 86 21-47
  • [4] Fricker E(1995)Telling and trusting: Reductionism and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony Mind 104 393-411
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