Acceptable Contradictions: Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros et al.

被引：0

作者：

Sam Alxatib

Peter Pagin

Uli Sauerland

机构：

[1] Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Department of Linguistics and Philosophy

[2] Stockholm University,Department of Philosophy

[3] Zentrum für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft,undefined

来源：

Journal of Philosophical Logic | 2013年 / 42卷

关键词：

Contradiction; Vagueness; Fuzzy logic; Pragmatics; Natural language; Conjunction;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn’t tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction are interpreted as intensional operators.

引用

页码：619 / 634

页数：15

共 20 条

[1]

Bonini N(1999)On the psychology of vague predicates Mind and Language 14 377-393

[2]

Osherson D(2012)Tolerant, classical, strict Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 347-385

[3]

Viale R(1998)Reciprocal expressions and the concept of reciprocity Linguistics and Philosophy 21 159-210

[4]

Williamson T(1975)Vagueness, truth and logic Synthese 30 265-300

[5]

Cobreros P(1995)Prototype theory and compositionality Cognition 57 129-191

[6]

Egré P(2012)Where does the strongest meaning hypothesis apply? Snippets 25 13-14

[7]

Ripley D(2011)Vagueness, logic and use: Four experimental studies on vagueness Mind & Language 26 540-573

[8]

van Rooij R(undefined)undefined undefined undefined undefined-undefined

[9]

Dalrymple M(undefined)undefined undefined undefined undefined-undefined

[10]

Kanazawa M(undefined)undefined undefined undefined undefined-undefined

← 1 2 →