Will managerial delegation impede upstream collusion?

被引：0

作者：

Leonard F. S. Wang

Han Wang

机构：

[1] Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wenlan School of Business

[2] The Ohio State University,Department of Economics

来源：

Journal of Economics | 2021年 / 134卷

关键词：

Collusion; Delegation; Price competition; Vertical channel; D2; L2;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We investigate the collusive incentive for far-sighted manufacturers selling via managerial retailers. In contrast to the existing literature, we find that revenue delegation can impede upstream collusion in Bertrand models. This happens due to market exit in the deviation phase when products are close substitutes. The result of managerial delegation hindering upstream collusion is robust if we allow manufacturers to consider partial collusion. Furthermore, we show that less intensified downstream competition does not always harm consumers. If upstream collusion is less sustainable with managerial retailers, consumers can be better-off.

引用

页码：127 / 146

页数：19