Welfare egalitarianism with other-regarding preferences

被引:0
作者
Rafael Treibich
机构
[1] University of Southern Denmark,
来源
Social Choice and Welfare | 2019年 / 52卷
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摘要
We consider the problem of dividing a perfectly divisible good among individuals who have other-regarding preferences. Assuming no legitimate claims and purely ordinal preferences, how should society measure social welfare so as to satisfy basic principles of efficiency and fairness? In a simple model of average externalities, we characterize the class of social preferences which give full priority to the individual with the lowest egalitarian equivalent.
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页码:1 / 28
页数:27
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