Representation of finite games as network congestion games
被引:0
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作者:
Igal Milchtaich
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机构:Bar-Ilan University,Department of Economics
Igal Milchtaich
机构:
[1] Bar-Ilan University,Department of Economics
来源:
International Journal of Game Theory
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2013年
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42卷
关键词:
Network games;
Congestion games;
Potential games ;
Game isomorphism;
C72;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
学科分类号:
摘要:
Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game.
机构:
Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, IsraelTechnion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
Penn, Michal
Polukarov, Maria
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机构:
Univ Southampton, Sch Comp Sci & Elect, Southampton SO17 1BJ, Hants, EnglandTechnion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
Polukarov, Maria
Tennenholtz, Moshe
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机构:
Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
Microsoft Israel Res & Dev Ctr, IL-46725 Herzliyya, IsraelTechnion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel