An Investigation on the Effectiveness of Joint Receiver–Carrier Policies to Increase Truck Traffic in the Off-peak HoursPart II: The Behavior of Carriers

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of comprehensive policies-aimed at fostering a switch of truck traffic from the peak to the off-peak hours-targeting receivers and carriers of goods in urban areas. The paper is based on the fundamental premise that truck traffic in congested urban areas could move to the off-peak hours, if and only if, the receivers of the cargoes are willing to accept off-peak deliveries. The paper provides a conceptual description, based on game theory, of the fundamental interactions between receivers and carriers and discusses empirical data that confirms the basic findings from the game theoretical analyses. The policy analyses are based on stated preference data that are analyzed using discrete choice models. The data consider different policy scenarios targeting both receivers and carriers. The receiver centered policies considered include tax deductions and shipping cost discounts to companies willing to accept off-peak deliveries; while the carrier centered policies include: a request from receivers to do off-peak deliveries; a request from receivers to do off-peak deliveries combined with toll savings for trucks traveling during the off-peak hours; and a request from receivers to do off-peak deliveries combined with financial rewards for trucks traveling during the off-peak hours. This paper is the second in a set of papers providing insight into possible public policies aimed at encouraging carriers to implement off-peak deliveries. This paper focuses on carrier centered scenarios, the estimation of market shares for the joint scenarios, and policy implications. In addition to analyzing the overall effectiveness of comprehensive receiver–carrier policies, the paper discusses the special cases of large traffic generators and neighborhoods with high truck traffic as potential targets of specific off-peak delivery initiatives.