The psychology of volition

被引:0
作者
Chris Frith
机构
[1] Aarhus University,Interacting Minds Centre
[2] All Souls College,Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging
[3] UCL,undefined
来源
Experimental Brain Research | 2013年 / 229卷
关键词
Volition; Agency; Responsibility; Discussion; Culture;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Volition can be studied from two perspectives. From the third-person view, volitional behaviour is internally generated, rather than being determined by the immediate environmental context, and is therefore, to some extent, unpredictable. Such behaviour is not unique to humans, since it is seen in many other species including invertebrates. From the first-person view, our experience of volitional behaviour includes a vivid sense of agency. We feel that, through our intentions, we can cause things to happen and we can choose between different actions. Our experience of agency is not direct. It depends on sub-personal inferences derived from prior expectations and sensations associated with movement. As a result, our experiences and intuitions about volition can be unreliable and uncertain. Nevertheless, our experience of agency is not a mere epiphenomenon. Anticipation of the regret we might feel after making the wrong choice can alter behaviour. Furthermore, the strong sense of responsibility, associated with agency, has a critical role in creating social cohesion and group benefits. We can only study the experience of agency in humans who can describe their experiences. The discussion of the experience of volition, that introspection and communication make possible, can change our experience of volitional actions. As a result, agency, regret and responsibility are cultural phenomena that are unique to humans.
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页码:289 / 299
页数:10
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