Social motives in integrative negotiation: The mediating influence of procedural fairness

被引：2
作者：
Bianca Beersma
Carsten K.W. De Dreu
机构：
[1] Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam
[2] Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WB Amsterdam
来源：
Social Justice Research | 2003年 / 16卷 / 3期
关键词：
Group negotiation; Procedural fairness; Social motives;
D O I：
10.1023/A:1026032628634
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Although a large body of research has examined the influence of social motives on integrative negotiation, little is known about how social motives affect procedural fairness judgments in negotiation. In two experiments concerned with small group negotiation, we manipulated group members' social motives (pro-social vs. egoistic), and measured joint negotiation outcomes and procedural fairness. Experiment 1 showed that, compared to group members with an egoistic motivation, those with a pro-social motive experienced more procedural fairness, which was partly responsible for the higher joint outcomes they obtained. In Experiment 2, we manipulated social motives and decision rule. Results showed that pro-social groups experienced more procedural fairness than egoistic groups when a majority rule was applied, but not when a unanimity rule was applied.
引用
收藏
页码：217 / 239
页数：22
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