Relativism and disagreement

被引:0
作者
John MacFarlane
机构
[1] University of California,Department of Philosophy
[2] Berkeley,undefined
来源
Philosophical Studies | 2007年 / 132卷
关键词
Relativism; Contextualism; Disagreement; Subjective discourse;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The relativist's central objection to contextualism is that it fails to account for the disagreement we perceive in discourse about "subjective" matters, such as whether stewed prunes are delicious. If we are to adjudicate between contextualism and relativism, then, we must first get clear about what it is for two people to disagree. This question turns out to be surprisingly difficult to answer. A partial answer is given here; although it is incomplete, it does help shape what the relativist must say if she is to do better than the contextualist in securing genuine disagreement.
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页码:17 / 31
页数:14
相关论文
共 7 条
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