The compensation of non-executive directors: Rationale, form, and findings

被引:21
作者
Hahn P.D. [1 ]
Lasfer M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Cass Business School, London EC1Y 8TZ
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
Board of directors; Corporate governance codes; Non-executive directors; Performance; Remuneration;
D O I
10.1007/s10997-010-9134-5
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Corporate governance guidelines in many countries do not specify the determinants of non-executive director compensation and the empirical evidence has only briefly and indirectly addressed this issue. We show that this question is fundamentally complex because (a) whilst the roles of non-executive directors are relatively well stated, their actual contributions remain unclear, (b) governance codes have not discussed the ways in which non-executive directors should undertake their roles and (c) non-executive director contribution may be unobservable. As a result, their efforts, contribution and/or performance are difficult to measure. Nevertheless, we find the literature related to non-executive directors strongly supportive of some sort of remuneration that is a function of performance and effort to align non-executive directors with their duties and make boards more efficient in undertaking their duties. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
引用
收藏
页码:589 / 601
页数:12
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