On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous ordinal and normal form games

被引:0
作者
Vincenzo Scalzo
机构
[1] University of Naples Federico II,Department of Economics and Statistics (DISES)
来源
Economic Theory Bulletin | 2020年 / 8卷
关键词
Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium; Ordinal games; Discontinuous games; Strict condition; C72;
D O I
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中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Our aim is to investigate the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the general setting of ordinal games. Using a new property, called strict condition, we identify a class of discontinuous games where there exists a unique Nash equilibrium if and only if the single deviation property is satisfied.
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页码:163 / 168
页数:5
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