Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules

被引：0
|
作者：
Stephen Ching
Lin Zhou
机构：
[1]  Department of Economics and Finance,
[2] City University of Hong Kong,undefined
[3] Kowloon Tong,undefined
[4] HONG KONG (e-mail: steve.ching@cityu.edu.hk),undefined
[5]  Department of Economics,undefined
[6] Arizona State University,undefined
[7] Tempe,undefined
[8] AZ 85287-3806,undefined
[9] USA (e-mail: Lin.Zhou@asu.edu),undefined
来源：
Social Choice and Welfare | 2002年 / 19卷
关键词：
Social Choice; Type Result; Choice Rule; Multiple Outcome; Impossibility Theorem;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In this paper we introduce a new definition of strategy-proofness for multi-valued social choice correspondences. We prove two Gibbard-Satterthwaite type results for strategy-proof social choice correspondences. These results show that allowing multiple outcomes as social choices will not necessarily lead to an escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.
引用
收藏
页码：569 / 580
页数：11
相关论文
共 50 条
12345