How to Forget that “Know” is Factive

被引：0
作者：
Savas L. Tsohatzidis
机构：
[1] Aristotle University of Thessaloniki,Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Philosophy
来源：
Acta Analytica | 2012年 / 27卷
关键词：
Factivity; Knowledge; Implicature;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper examines, and rejects, a recent argument to the effect that knowledge is not truth-entailing, i.e. that “know” is not factive.
引用
收藏
页码：449 / 459
页数：10
相关论文
共 5 条
[1]  
Blome-Tillmann M(2008)Conversational implicature and the cancellability test Analysis 68 156-160
[2]  
Borge S(2009)Conversational implicatures and cancellability Acta Analytica 24 149-154
[3]  
Hazlett A(2010)The myth of factive verbs Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXX 497-522
[4]  
Stjernberg F(2009)Restricting factiveness Philosophical Studies 146 29-48
[5]  
Weiner M(2006)Are all conversational implicatures cancellable? Analysis 66 127-30
1