The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach

In this paper a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness so construed is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible for her to easily obtain as much information as she may need. The argument for this account of consciousness' functional role will proceed in three main stages. First the phenomenological approach to consciousness as peripheral self-awareness will be expounded and endorsed. Second an account of the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness will be offered. Finally the account of the functional role of peripheral self-awareness will be obtained by straightforward extension from the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness. © 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers.