The Causal and Explanatory Role of Information Stored in Connectionist Networks

被引:0
作者
Daniel M. Haybron
机构
[1] Rutgers University,Department of Philosophy
来源
Minds and Machines | 2000年 / 10卷
关键词
connectionism; mental representation; neural networks; causation; explanation philosophy of mind;
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学科分类号
摘要
In this paper I defend the propriety of explaining the behavior of distributed connectionist networks by appeal to selected data stored therein. In particular, I argue that if there is a problem with such explanations, it is a consequence of the fact that information storage in networks is superpositional, and not because it is distributed. I then develop a “proto-account” of causation for networks, based on an account of Andy Clark's, that shows even superpositionality does not undermine information-based explanation. Finally, I argue that the resulting explanations are genuinely informative and not vacuous.
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页码:361 / 380
页数:19
相关论文
共 11 条
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