The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital

被引：6
作者：
Edward J. López
机构：
[1] University of North Texas,Department of Economics
来源：
The Review of Austrian Economics | 2002年 / 15卷 / 2-3期
关键词：
models of legislators; political capital; market processes;
D O I：
10.1023/A:1015770705872
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting.
引用
收藏
页码：211 / 228
页数：17
相关论文
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