A recursive core for partition function form games

被引：0
作者：
László Á. Kóczy
机构：
[1] Maastricht University,Department of Economics
来源：
Theory and Decision | 2007年 / 63卷
关键词：
core; externalities; optimism; partition function; pessimism;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We present a well-defined generalisation of the core to coalitional games with externalities, where the value of a deviation is given by an endogenous response, the solution (if nonempty: the core) of the residual game.
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页码：41 / 51
页数：10
相关论文
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