To Bribe or Not to Bribe? An Experimental Analysis of Corruption

被引：0
作者：
Massimo Finocchiaro Castro
机构：
[1] Università Mediterranea di Reggio Calabria,Department of Law and Economics
来源：
Italian Economic Journal | 2021年 / 7卷
关键词：
Corruption; Reciprocity; Experiments; C92; D73; H41; Z13;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We investigate the phenomenon of corruption in an experimental setting. The first treatment studies the role of reciprocity in establishing corrupt relationships between two agents. Corruption occurs when public officials accept bribes and reward the briber at the expenses of others. The second treatment introduces two features that negatively affect bribery: increasing the cost of bribery and introducing the monitoring agents. In this case, corruption occurs when the monitoring agent conceals the observed bribe-exchange. The last two treatments disentangle the effects of the two features affecting bribery. Our results show that high bribery cost and the presence of monitoring agents curb corrupt behaviors mildly.
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页码：487 / 508
页数：21
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