How do visual representations account for time? Is it the case that they represent time by themselves possessing temporal properties (temporal mirroring) or by atemporal markers/tags (temporal tagging)? This question has been asked for the past 5 decades and more, in neuroscience, philosophy, and psychology. To address this debate, we designed a study to test temporal correspondence. We tested whether a temporal property (flicker frequency) could influence figure–ground segregation, and in turn, reciprocally, whether a figure–ground segregation would alter a temporal property (here, temporal resolution). We manipulated flicker frequency of dots on either side of an ambiguous edge in Experiment 1 and asked participants to indicate the figural region. In Experiment 2, we measured temporal sensitivity using a temporal order judgment (TOJ) task in both figural and ground regions. We showed temporal correspondence by showing specifically that figure–ground segregation depends on flicker frequency differences between two regions in ambiguous displays, where slow-flickering regions are seen as figural (Experiment 1). Reciprocally, in Experiment 2, we showed that participants performed a temporal-order judgment task better when the task had to be performed on a region seen as background compared with the same region seen as a figure. We show how relatively slower flickering regions are seen as figural, and correspondingly, seeing a region as figural is associated with a poorer temporal resolution. Our results collectively allow us to demonstrate a tight temporal correspondence in figure–ground perception, which could be explained using the parvocellular and magnocellular pathways, the two major retino-geniculo-cortical pathways.