Ownership Concentration and CSR Policy of European Multinational Enterprises

被引:0
作者
Lammertjan Dam
Bert Scholtens
机构
[1] University of Groningen,Energy and Sustainability Centre, Department of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Business
来源
Journal of Business Ethics | 2013年 / 118卷
关键词
Blockholders ; Concentrated ownership; Corporate social responsibility; Europe; Multinational enterprises;
D O I
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中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This study investigates how ownership concentration in European multinational firms is associated with these firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). We employ factor analysis on responsibility data from EIRiS and use a regression analysis. Using firm-level data for almost 700 European firms, we find that shareholder concentration is significantly related to such policies. That is, more concentrated ownership goes hand in hand with poorer CSR policies. In our analysis, we control for size, leverage, profitability, industry, and country of origin. We use several indicators for ownership concentration. We also find that with more concentrated ownership, CSR of the firm gets worse. We suggest that especially with large shareholders, CSR would need to be included in their performance assessment.
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页码:117 / 126
页数:9
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