The ‘Passes-For’ Fallacy and the Future of Critical Thinking

被引:0
作者
William Goodwin
机构
[1] Rowan University,Department of Philosophy and Religion
来源
Argumentation | 2010年 / 24卷
关键词
Fallacy; Susan Haack; Critical thinking; Relativism;
D O I
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中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In this paper, I characterize Susan Haack’s so called “passes-for” fallacy, analyze both what makes this inference compelling and why it is illegitimate, and finally explain why reflecting on the passes-for fallacy—and others like it—should become part of critical thinking pedagogy for humanities students. The analysis proceeds by examining a case of the passes-for fallacy identified by Haack in the work of Ruth Bleier. A charitable reconstruction of Bleier’s reasoning shows that it is enlightening to regard the passes-for fallacy as an abuse of the application conditions of the concept of bias, rather than as an egregious case of Hasty Generalization.
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页码:363 / 374
页数:11
相关论文
共 8 条
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