What it takes to believe

被引：0
作者：
Daniel Rothschild
机构：
[1] University College London,
来源：
Philosophical Studies | 2020年 / 177卷
关键词：
Belief; Credence; Lexical semantics;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Much linguistic evidence supports the view believing something only requires thinking it likely. I assess and reject a rival view, based on recent work on homogeneity in natural language, according to which belief is a strong, demanding attitude. I discuss the implications of the linguistic considerations about ‘believe’ for our philosophical accounts of belief.
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收藏
页码：1345 / 1362
页数：17
相关论文
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