Rent-Seeking in Research Markets

被引:3
作者
Rajeev K. Goel
机构
[1] Illinois State University Normal,Department of Economics
关键词
Economic Growth; Previous Literature; Policy Implication; Industrial Organization; Research Market;
D O I
10.1023/A:1022978129414
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Using a standard model of uncertain innovation, this paper examines research rivalry and rent-seeking rivalry in innovation markets. Previous literature has not considered the implications of rent-seeking in research markets. We find that greater rent-seeking by the rival unambiguously lowers own profit-maximizing research and rent-seeking activity. On the other hand, greater research spending by the rival also lowers own research and rent-seeking, especially when the probability of own innovation is low. Policy implications are discussed.
引用
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页码:103 / 109
页数:6
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