Rent-Seeking in Research Markets

被引：3

作者：

Rajeev K. Goel

机构：

[1] Illinois State University Normal,Department of Economics

来源：

The Journal of Technology Transfer | 2003年 / 28卷 / 2期

关键词：

Economic Growth; Previous Literature; Policy Implication; Industrial Organization; Research Market;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1022978129414

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Using a standard model of uncertain innovation, this paper examines research rivalry and rent-seeking rivalry in innovation markets. Previous literature has not considered the implications of rent-seeking in research markets. We find that greater rent-seeking by the rival unambiguously lowers own profit-maximizing research and rent-seeking activity. On the other hand, greater research spending by the rival also lowers own research and rent-seeking, especially when the probability of own innovation is low. Policy implications are discussed.

引用

页码：103 / 109

页数：6

共 19 条

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