Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo

被引：17

作者：

Faraci D. ^{[2
]}

Shoemaker D. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Philosophy and Murphy Institute, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, 70118

[2] Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH

来源：

Review of Philosophy and Psychology | 2010年 / 1卷 / 3期

关键词：

Moral Responsibility; Moral Emotion; Moral Fact; Mere Exposure; Basic Demand;

D O I：

10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one's actions are expressions of one's deepest or "real" self, one might still not be morally responsible for one's actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father's (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf's data for this conclusion derives from what she takes to be our "pretheoretic intuitions" about JoJo. As it turns out, though, experimental data on actual pretheoretic intuitions does not seem to support Wolf's claim. In this paper, we present such data and argue that, at least with respect to this particular objection, the RSV can survive Wolf's attack intact. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

引用

页码：319 / 332

页数：13

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