Fair division of indivisible items between two players: design parameters for Contested Pile methods

被引:0
作者
Rudolf Vetschera
D. Marc Kilgour
机构
[1] University of Vienna,Department of Business Administration
[2] Wilfrid Laurier University,Department of Mathematics
来源
Theory and Decision | 2014年 / 76卷
关键词
Fair division; Contested Pile methods; Computational Study;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Contested Pile methods are two-phase procedures for the fair allocation of indivisible items to two players. In the Generation Phase, items over which the players’ preferences differ widely enough are allocated. “Contested” items are placed in the Contested Pile, which is then allocated in the Splitting Phase. Each phase can be carried out using several different techniques; we perform a comprehensive analysis of the resulting design variants using a computational model. The properties of fairness and efficiency, generally achieved in the Generation Phase, must be traded off against robustness to manipulation. We find that the recently developed Undercut procedure for the Splitting Phase outperforms alternative methods in both fairness and efficiency. In general, procedures that keep the Contested Pile relatively small and incorporate the Undercut procedure score well in both fairness and efficiency, but are prone to manipulation.
引用
收藏
页码:547 / 572
页数:25
相关论文
共 36 条
[1]  
Beersma B(2002)Integrative and distributive negotiation in small groups: Effects of task structure, decision rule, and social motive Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 87 227-252
[2]  
De Dreu C(2005)Nobody left behind: Fair allocation of indivisible goods ACM SIGecom Exchanges 5 11-18
[3]  
Bezáková I.(2012)The undercut procedure: An algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items Social Choice and Welfare 39 615-631
[4]  
Dani V.(2006)Issues in multiagent resource allocation Informatica 30 3-31
[5]  
Brams SJ(2007)How to allocate hard candies fairly Mathematical Social Sciences 54 218-237
[6]  
Kilgour DM(1966)A short proof of Sperner’s lemma Journal of Combinatorial Theory 1 299-573
[7]  
Klamler C(2008)Maxmin fairness in multi-commodity flows Computers and Operations Research 35 557-38
[8]  
Chevaleyre Y(1992)Negotiation analysis: A characterization and review Management Science 38 18-179
[9]  
Dunne PE(1991)Information exchange in negotiation Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 27 161-295
[10]  
Endriss U(1992)An evaluation of dependent variables in experimental negotiation studies: Impasse rates and Pareto efficiency Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51 273-2130