Equity as a Prerequisite for Stability of Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision

被引：0
作者：
Wolfgang Buchholz
Alexander Haupt
Wolfgang Peters
机构：
[1] University of Regensburg,Department of Economics and Econometrics
[2] Plymouth University,Plymouth Graduate School of Management and Plymouth Business School
[3] European University Viadrina,Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
来源：
Environmental and Resource Economics | 2016年 / 65卷
关键词：
Public goods; Core; Equity; Stability of cooperation; C71; D63; H41;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Analysing cooperative provision of a global public good such as climate protection, we explore the relationship between equitable burden sharing on the one hand and core stability on the other. To assess the size of the burden which a public good contribution entails for a country, we make use of a specific measure based on Moulin (Econometrica 55:963–977, 1987). In particular, we show that a Pareto optimal allocation which is not in the core can always be blocked by a group of countries with the highest Moulin sacrifices. In this sense, it is the ‘overburdening’ and thus ‘unfair’ treatment of some countries that provides the reason for core instability. By contrast, a Pareto optimal allocation is in the core if the public good contributions are fairly equally distributed according to their Moulin sacrifices. The potential implications of our theoretical analysis for global climate policy are also discussed.
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页码：61 / 78
页数：17
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