Drivers are blamed more than their automated cars when both make mistakes

被引:0
作者
Edmond Awad
Sydney Levine
Max Kleiman-Weiner
Sohan Dsouza
Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Azim Shariff
Jean-François Bonnefon
Iyad Rahwan
机构
[1] Media Lab,Department of Economics
[2] Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
[3] University of Exeter Business School,Department of Psychology
[4] Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Department of Psychology
[5] Harvard University,Toulouse School of Economics (TSM
[6] University of British Columbia Vancouver,Research), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
[7] University of Toulouse Capitole,Centre for Humans & Machines
[8] Max-Planck Institute for Human Development,Institute for Data, Systems and Society
[9] Massachusetts Institute of Technology,undefined
来源
Nature Human Behaviour | 2020年 / 4卷
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摘要
When an automated car harms someone, who is blamed by those who hear about it? Here we asked human participants to consider hypothetical cases in which a pedestrian was killed by a car operated under shared control of a primary and a secondary driver and to indicate how blame should be allocated. We find that when only one driver makes an error, that driver is blamed more regardless of whether that driver is a machine or a human. However, when both drivers make errors in cases of human–machine shared-control vehicles, the blame attributed to the machine is reduced. This finding portends a public under-reaction to the malfunctioning artificial intelligence components of automated cars and therefore has a direct policy implication: allowing the de facto standards for shared-control vehicles to be established in courts by the jury system could fail to properly regulate the safety of those vehicles; instead, a top-down scheme (through federal laws) may be called for.
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页码:134 / 143
页数:9
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